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Introduction 
 
   Equality before the law is highly desired, yet it is still a challenging 
issue in modern legal systems. The economic crisis has acted as the 
catalyst of the retreat of the welfare state. For instance, inequality 
before the law is escalating after the legal aid cuts in the UK. Under the 
the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, 
many categories of criminal and, especially, civil cases no longer 
qualify for legal aid funding. The emerging trend is called Do It 
Yourself justice and the number of people who have no choice but to 
represent themselves in court has risen sharply. In the United States, 
since 1963, when the US Supreme Court decided the case of Gideon v 
Wainwright
1
, any defendant who cannot afford an attorney is entitled to 
have one appointed to implement the right to counsel as provided in the 
sixth amendment of the US constitution. Yet many states still charge 
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indigent defendants for the cost of their counsel, with legal 
representation not always been adequate.  
   This right to legal aid and professional legal representation is even 
more imperative in countries with adversarial legal systems, where it is 
the responsibility of the parties to gather evidence and prove the justice 
of their case. In the case of inequality on the efficiency of legal 
representation, it is a logical consequence that the better-represented 
party will have more chances of success, the truth will not be 
discovered, and justice will be impaired. Under these circumstances, the 
ideals of the rule of law and equality before the law are in danger of 
becoming empty slogans.  
   The issue of equality before the law in ancient Athens is too general. 
In analysing it, reference could be made to the features, rules and 
procedures of the Athenian legal system which promoted equality (at 
least political, not social or economic) for all its admitted participants. 
These are concepts such as isonomia and isegoria, the rotation and 
selection by lot of public officials, the equality of rights and duties, and 
the (at least nominal) equality of opportunity offered by the Athenian 
democracy. Focusing on the courts in particular, one could refer to the 
entirely symmetrical position of litigants, the equal duration of 
speeches, the swearing of identical oaths and other similar features 
promoting equality before the law. All these cumulatively provide a 
manifestation of equality in the era of maturity of the classical Athenian 
democracy. Nonetheless, in order to understand the evolution of the 
notion of equality and its contribution to the final product, namely the 
developed Athenian legal system of the fourth century BC, it is 
necessary to take a step back and narrate the story of this system from 
its early days. A sine qua non of this narration is the discussion of the 
reforms of Solon in the early sixth century BC.  
   The focus of this paper will be on Solon’s attitude towards wealth as 
can be extracted by his legislation and poems. The argument is that part 
of the rationale of Solon’s legislation aimed at the regulation and check 
of the influence of wealth in the Athenian administration of justice. 
There was a conscious effort on the part of the lawgiver to place limits 
on the use and influence of wealth and to make economic resources a 
positive feature, at the service of law and community, rather than the 
opposite. In the Solonian reforms we find the seed of the subsequent 
dominant characteristics of the Athenian legal system which might offer 
new insights on the modern manifestation of inequality before the law: 
egalitarianism and amateurism. 
 
 
Egalitarianism and Amateurism 
 
   Egalitarianism was strictly preserved in the Athenian legal order. In 
all its institutions and constituents, the fourth century Athenian legal 
system was consistent in its (sometimes futile) pursuit of strict 
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democracy. Total political equality by demolishing the barriers of birth 
and wealth, signified a right for each Athenian citizen to participate in 
public business. In the courts in particular, every Athenian citizen had 
the right to initiate proceedings or to serve as a juror in the popular 
panels deciding cases. Each year, any male citizen over the age of thirty 
could put himself forward and be selected by sortition as one of the 
6,000 jurors that manned the Athenian courts. Private cases were 
decided by a democratic jury of at least 201 members, public cases by 
at least 501, a number that in most serious cases was multiplied and 
(though extremely rarely if ever) could extend to all 6,000 jurors. 
Verdicts were taken by majority vote, without the guidance and aid of 
legal experts or judges.  
   Directly connected with the democratic nature of the Athenian legal 
system, is the pervasive ideology of amateurism. In essence, the 
interconnection of these two characteristics lays on the Athenian belief 
that professionalism and democracy were regarded as, at bottom, 
contradictory. Litigants, sometimes with (in principle) minimal help 
from logographoi (speechwriters), conducted research into the relevant 
laws and decrees, and they largely decided the strategy and presentation 
of their case. The ideology of amateurism in the Athenian legal system 
led the protagonists to neglect any systematic and professional 
treatment of legal rules. The Athenians, departing from the idea of 
expertise, regarded law as grounded on common sense and being the 
common property of the citizens. Egalitarianism and amateurism were 
deeply entrenched in the democratic ideology of the polis, to the extent 
that legal experts were seen with suspicion and hostility, being 
characterised as sycophants. Modern scholarship suggests that this 
democratic ideology was the basis of amateurism in the Athenian legal 
system. A prominent classical scholar has described the rationale 
behind amateurism as follows: 
‘The Athenians ensured the absence of professionalism in 
their administration... In order to make the law democratic, 
the Athenians saw to it that no bar or bench should grow up: 
pay for advocates was forbidden and juries were composed 
of several hundred ordinary citizens.’1 
   This is true but it is only part of the explanation. After all, many of the 
egalitarian features of the Athenian legal system were introduced before 
the emergence of democracy and others only gradually evolved in order 
to meet the democratic ends of the fifth and fourth centuries. Solon, 
introduced his reforms in the early sixth century, almost a century 
before the reforms of Cleisthenes in 508/507 BC which are considered 
to be the beginning of the democratic constitution in Athens. In the 
newly monetised city states of the archaic period, with Athens being the 
most characteristic example, amateurism was a way to overcome the 
shock of the emerging monetisation, and address the potential or real 
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problem of corruption by placing limits on the influence of wealth in 
the public sphere and by making it subordinate to and at the service of 
law. 
 
The problem 
   In the archaic period between the 8th and the 6th centuries BC, there 
was widespread discontent with the rule of aristocrats by birth. 
Evidence shows that, instead of the traditional approach viewing the 
masses as insignificant and passive enduring a lot from the arbitrariness 
of the elite, there actually existed a firm sense of identity and self-
esteem of the peasant class’, expressed in a ‘deep-rooted and self-
conscious literary expression of anti-aristocratic opinion’1. Since the 
epics of Homer we can observe in the speech of Thersites the 
dissatisfaction with the king’s greed, selfishness and disregard of fair 
distribution and dealing. In spite of the pro-aristocratic orientation of 
the Homeric epics, an emerging class ideology of the masses is evident 
in Thersites’ remarks, even if it was not legitimate for him to take part 
in this intra-elite quarrel:  
‘"Agamemnon," he cried, "what ails you now and what 
more do you want? Your tents are filled with bronze and 
with fair women, for whenever we take a town we give you 
the pick of them. Would you have yet more gold, which 
some Trojan is to give you as a ransom for his son, when I 
or another Achaean has taken him prisoner? Or is it some 
young girl to hide and lie with? It is not well that you, the 
ruler of the Achaeans, should bring them into such misery. 
Weakling cowards, women rather than men, let us sail 
home, and leave this man here at Troy to stew in his own 
prizes of honour, and discover whether we were of any 
service to him or no."’ (Homer, Iliad, 2.224-238) 
   Among the rights and responsibilities of the elite was the adjudication 
of disputes. In another passage of the Iliad, we can observe for the very 
first time in Greek literature the idea that crooked judgments of the 
aristocrats trigger the wrath of gods:   
   “[a]nd Zeus sends violent rain, in anger against those who 
deliver corrupt judgements in free assembly, careless of 
divine vengeance and void of all justice.” (Homer, Iliad. 
16.387) 
   The criticism against the elite’s monopoly of administration of justice 
is much more evident in Hesiod. In the Works and Days a causal link is 
argued between corruption and crooked judgments by the ‘bribe-
devouring kings’. 
“There is a noise when Justice is being dragged in the way 
where those who devour bribes (ἄνδρες δωροφάγοι) and 
give sentence with crooked judgements, take her. And she, 
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wrapped in mist, follows to the city and haunts of the 
people, weeping, and bringing mischief to men, even to 
such as have driven her forth in that they did not deal 
straightly with her.” (Hesiod, Works and Days, 216-224) 
 
   “And there is virgin Justice, the daughter of Zeus, who is 
honoured and reverenced among the gods who dwell on 
Olympus, and whenever anyone hurts her with lying 
slander, she sits beside her father, Zeus the son of Cronos, 
and tells him of men's wicked heart, until the people pay for 
the mad folly of their basileis who, evilly minded, pervert 
judgement and give sentence crookedly. Keep watch against 
this, you basileis, and make straight your judgements, you 
who devour bribes (δωροφάγοι); put crooked judgements 
altogether from your thoughts.” (Hesiod, Works and Days 
256-265) 
   The first written laws that date from this period signify a serious 
effort on the part of the community (or of other competitor members of 
the elite trying to associate themselves with the community
1
) to check 
any abuse of the system by the ruling officials
2
. Evidence for this 
increasingly significant role of the demos (which has even been 
interpreted as ‘a pan-Hellenic movement towards egalitarianism’3) can 
be sought for in the plebiscitary politics of the early archaic age and the 
initial stages of polis-development
4
. Even with the consolidation of the 
elite ideology and aristocratic power in the seventh and sixth centuries, 
other groups, notably the emerging hoplite farmers served as a check, 
with written law being a means to this end
5
. For example, the written 
inscription from Dreros (dated from c. 650 BC) provides against the 
misappropriation of the public office of kosmos against the laws and 
procedures of the polis
6
. In a law from Chios (c. 600-550 BC) we find a 
provision granting the right of appeal to a popular council against the 
decisions of magistrates. Apparently, the Chians tried to limit the 
monopoly of adjudicative powers of the elite judges, probably as a 
                                            
1
 The fact that the community was acting as the legitimising force of the written laws 
is evident from the wording of the inscriptions which generally provides that ‘The 
polis has thus decided’. 
2
 See Gagarin (1986) and Gagarin (2005). Cf. Thomas (2005) at 52: ‘Archaic Greek 
cities seem to have been aware that the officials themselves might be the problem, 
hence the clauses in so many archaic laws that seek to control the officials and force 
them to obey the new law’. A written (especially homicide) law code strengthens the 
judicial power in limiting the unchecked reciprocal violence within the community 
stemming from self-help. 
3
 Robinson (1997).  
4
 Hammer (2005); Raaflaub & Wallace (2007).   
5
 See Donlan (1997); Raaflaub (1997).    
6 ‘The city has thus decided; when a man has been kosmos, the same man shall not be 
kosmos again for ten years. If he does act as kosmos, whatever judgment he gives, he 
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response to arbitrariness. Moreover, the same law provided for 
sanctions against the acceptance of bribes by public officials
1
. Similar 
laws were passed slightly later in Eretria and Gortyn.  
   As far as Athens is concerned, we are better informed about the 
circumstances which prevailed before the legal initiatives of Draco (c. 
624-620 BC) and Solon (594/3 BC). This was a time of internal 
instability, mainly due to intra-elite competition and conflict as can be 
seen in the Cylonian affair (632 BC). The resulting weakening of the 
competing elite groups and, probably, their effort to associate 
themselves with wider sections of the population in order to find the 
popular support necessary for the establishment of tyranny
2
, were 
conducive to the escalation of disorder which affected the whole polis. 
Moreover, the arbitrariness of elite officials as can be seen in the role of 
the Alcmaeonid archon Megacles in the Cylonian agos (Plutarch. Solon 
12), highlighted the need for a radical reform. As a result, recourse to 
written law for the survival of the polis was made imperative. From 
then on, instead of oral laws known to a special class, at times 
arbitrarily applied in an ad hoc manner, laws were publicly available, 
thus becoming a common property of the citizens
3
. Despite the success 
of Draco’s law on homicide4, strife had not ended in Athens. By 600 
BC the small farmers were in actual danger of total dependency or even 
enslavement to the rich landowners who, in addition to their monopoly 
of political and religious authority, exploited their economic advantages 
to the extreme. According to Aristotle the situation was close to a 
bloody stasis, “the party struggle being violent and the parties 
remaining arrayed in opposition to one another for a long time” 
(Athenaion Politeia 5.2). Plutarch is explicit in attributing the perilous 
condition of the city to economic division, namely a ‘disparity between 
the rich and the poor’ (cf. Athenaion Politeia 2.1)...All the common 
people were in debt to the rich. For they either tilled their lands for 
them, paying them a sixth of the increase (whence they were called 
Hectemoroi and Thetes), or else they pledged their persons for debts 
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 ‘And if either one of the demarchoi or the basilees accepts bribes they shall pay 
double...’. 
2
 Ellis & Stanton (1968). 
3
 Gagarin (1986); Gagarin (2005) and Gagarin (2008). Cf. Thomas (2005) at 
47:‘There was also surely the fear that laws, once agreed, would be ignored or 
countermanded by the very officials or other members of the ruling elite who were 
supposedly bound by them: the publicly written versions were accessible and visible, 
and even if few of the citizens could actually read them, there were perhaps enough 
who could and more who could point to the public inscription as a reminder of the 
law. Thus there are sometimes severe penalties for tampering with the inscription.’ 
4
 The traditional view is that only Draco’s homicide laws survived Solon’s 
intervention. To be sure, they were re-inscribed on stone stelai by the anagrapheis in 
409/8 BC, placed in front of the Stoa of the King Archon, and were retained down to 
the fourth century. Also, there is uncertainty as to the scope of Draco’s legislation. 
Carey (2013) recently has argued that ‘more of Draco’s work survived into the 
Classical period, both in substance and in procedure’ and that Draco had not confined 
himself in drafting laws solely on homicide. 
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and could be seized by their creditors, some becoming slaves at home, 
and others being sold into foreign countries (cf. Athenaion Politeia 2). 
Many, too, were forced to sell their own children (for there was no law 
against it), or go into exile, because of the cruelty of the money-lenders. 
At this point, the wisest of the Athenians cast their eyes upon Solon.’ 
(Plutarch, Solon, 13) 
    Solon was chosen for his impartiality and honesty, yet we are also 
informed that the rich accepted him ‘readily because he was well-to-do’ 
(Plutarch, Solon, 14). This is likely as it probably represents the status 
quo of dispute-settlement in Athens, whereby the rich largely controlled 
the administration of justice
1
. According to Humphreys, ‘one of the 
elements in the crisis which Solon was called upon to resolve in the 
early 6th century was their harsh application of the measures available 
to creditors seeking to recover debts… It is not surprising therefore that 
Solon’s contributions to the development of Attic law, in the early 6th 
century, were mainly concerned with preventing abuse of the powers 
which had been given to magistrates and were still wielded by local 
landlords’2.The political stranglehold exercised over the state by the 
noble Eupatridai (meaning ‘of good fathers’) was extended to the 
administration of justice mainly through the composition of the 
Areopagus by the ex-archons
3
.  
    The problem was evident and it was probably aggravated by the 
emerging monetisation of the archaic Greek city-states (if not yet the 
adoption of coinage). Wealth and especially money could be seen as a 
factor which improperly influenced the administration of justice by elite 
experts, hinted in the criticism of aristocratic ideology and practice as 
expressing greed, injustice, violence, excess, love of luxury, 
factionalism, hubris
4
. Therefore, among the developments and 
innovations which assisted in checking the power of the elite such as 
                                            
1
 According to Gagarin (1986) at 51, some officials did hear cases formally before 
Draco’s appointment as lawgiver in about 620BC (note the apparent offer of a trial in 
the case of Cylon’s conspiracy, testified only by Plutarch in Solon 12). It appears that 
before Solon lawsuits were tried either by the Areopagus (or other homicide courts) or 
by individual officials who were appointed on the basis of birth and wealth. Therefore 
appointment of officials was limited to a circle of leading families (Ath. Pol. 3.6). 
Also, indicative of the status quo is the episode mentioned by Plutarch (Solon 12.2) 
involving the trial of the polluted Alcmaeonids who accepted to appear before a court 
of ‘three hundred jurors selected from the nobility’.  
2
 Humphreys (1983) at 237. 
3
 To give but an idea of how things could have been in practice, we might point to an 
example of a slightly later date which nevertheless is telling. According to the Ath. 
Pol. 16.8, Peisistratus, while he was a tyrant, was summoned to the Areopagus to be 
tried on a charge of murder, he appeared in person to make his defence, and the issuer 
of the summons was frightened and left. Yet, we are informed by Thucydides (6.54.6) 
that ‘the family of Peisistratus took care that one of their own number should always 
be in office’ and this might explain why Peisistratus did not hesitate to appear before 
the court but also how intimidating the elite administration of justice could have been 
to the commoners.  
4
 Donlan (1999) at 68-75. 
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public written statutes, broader distribution of political power, widening 
the qualification for holding the public offices, and harsh penalties for 
magistrates, the influence of money in the legal system should also be 
controlled.  
 
 
Solon’s Approach to Wealth 
 
   In order to understand how Solon’s reforms countered these 
problems, it is useful to analyse his approach to wealth as 
communicated in his poetry. Nevertheless, a digression is necessary, 
since a discussion of the persona of the archaic Greek ‘lawgiver’ who 
appears precisely at this time is a prerequisite. Common patterns 
emerge in relation to these quasi-mythical figures, illuminating their 
(actual, imputed or desired) attributes and mentality. The lawgivers 
mainly emerged as a response to the social discord of the archaic 
poleis
1. As Wallace noted, ‘in redressing their social problems, three 
paths were open to archaic poleis: a single ruler, legal and constitutional 
reform, or popular revolt and what the sources call mass government, 
however we understand that concept’2. Some of the lawgivers, such as 
Pittakos of Mytilene, emerged as elected aisymnetai before becoming 
semi-tyrants (the word still lacked pejorative connotations), whereas 
others initially acted as arbitrators, subsequently devising more or less 
ad hoc legal responses to the socio-political problems
3
. These 
lawgivers, who became famous and legendary in subsequent years, 
were entrusted by the incipient political communities as impartial, wise, 
and politically astute figures who could rearrange the life of the 
community in a better way
4
. 
   Later (largely mythical) tradition has sketched the lawgivers as 
impartial (sometimes outsiders)
5
, exceptionally wise and virtuous, 
uniquely qualified to fulfil their challenging task, while some of them 
were ‘credited with divine assistance’6. These attributes allowed them 
to transcend the communal problems while remaining subordinate to 
the law. Famous is the episode involving Charondas, the lawgiver of 
Catany, who declared it a capital offence to enter the assembly carrying 
a weapon. Diodorus narrates this story:  
‘He had set out to the country carrying a dagger because 
of the robbers, and on his return the Assembly was in 
session and the commons in an uproar, whereupon he 
                                            
1
Szegedy-Maszak (1978). This is mostly true for the Greek mainland metropoleis, but 
to some extent not applicable to the Greek colonies.  
2
 Wallace (2007).  
3
Hölkeskamp (1992). 
4
 Aristotle discusses the greatest of these lawgivers at the end of Book 2 of the Politics 
(2.1274a). 
5
 Harris (2013); Cf. Epimenides in Plutarch, Solon. 12.4-5. 
6
 According to tradition, they acquired their instruction through extensive travel and 
study with one of the great philosophers. See Szegedy-Maszak (1978) at 202-204. 
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approached it because he was curious about the matter in 
dispute… And when one of them said, "You have 
annulled your own law," he replied, "Not so, by Zeus, I 
will uphold it," and drawing the dagger he slew himself.’ 
(Diodorus Siculus 12.19)
1
 
   Despite the questionable accuracy of such tales, the idea of 
equality before the law was manifestly urged by expecting the 
lawgiver himself to capitulate to the authority of the law. The 
law has become supreme
2
.  
 
Solon’s ideology 
   Solon was the legendary, ideal lawgiver of Athens who played the 
role of ‘the authority-figure who demonstrated the ethical coherence of 
Athenian laws and the legal system’s almost mystical continuity 
through time. This imagined figure impersonated the ethical prototype 
of the Athenian legal system, persuading the jurors to interpret the 
Athenian laws by reference to his demands’3. It is a fortunate event that 
we are in a position to reconstruct Solon’s philosophy through the 
surviving fragments of his poems and legislation. Solon was a Eupatrid 
who, nevertheless, did not hesitate to criticise his class and even go 
against its short-range interests. According to him, the hubris of the 
people’s leaders and their inability for moderation were to be blamed 
for the violent civil strife. Hubris is usually (correctly) translated as 
excess, which can be rephrased as the lack of appropriate limits. 
Therefore, this excessive desire for wealth leads them to unrighteous 
deeds, paying no attention to the forthcoming punishment by Dike:  
‘Her own people, for lucre's sake, are fain to make ruin of 
this great city by their folly. Unrighteous is the mind of the 
leaders of the commons, and their hubris goes before a 
fall; for they know not how to hold them from excess nor 
to direct in peace the jollity of their present feasting… but 
grow rich through the suasion of unrighteous deeds.’ 
 
‘[and] steal right and left with no respect for possessions 
sacred or public, nor have heed of the awful foundations 
of Justice.
 4’ (Fr. 4 [West]) 
                                            
1
 This biographical topos can be found in relation to other lawgivers such as Zaleucus 
(Ael. VH 13.24; Val. Max. 5.3, Eust. Ad Il. 1.197) and Diocles (Diod. Sic. 13.33 and 
12.19). Subordination to the law is recorded for Solon and Lycurgus. In particular, 
Plutarch (Solon 25) mentions that Solon ‘set sail, after obtaining from the Athenians 
leave of absence for ten years’. 
2
 According to Szegedy-Maszak (1978) at 208 this final stage can be described thus: 
‘the crisis resolved; the code is firmly established with some provision for its 
permanence, and the lawgiver departs’. 
3
 Adamidis (2017) at 185.   
4
 Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010). Disrespect for sacred money was considered a sign of a 
tyrant's behaviour in Xen. Hier. 4.11, and in Diod. Sic. 14.67.4, of barbarians in Hdt. 
1.105.2 etc. Also, Aeschylus, Eum. 539-42 is also a very close passage to Solon, since 
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   Excessive desire for wealth, identified by Solon as the main cause of 
civil strife, is associated with Dysnomia (Lawlessness). On the other 
hand, Eunomia ‘puts fetters upon the unrighteous...checks excess... 
straightens crooked judgments’ (Fr. 4). As a result, a warning was given 
to the wealthy elite: 
‘And as for you, who now have all the wealth you want, 
make the stern spirit gentler in your hearts, adjust to 
moderation. We will not accept this state of things, nor 
will it work for you.’ (Fr. 4c) 
   In this fragment we find Solon (a Eupatrid) associating himself with 
the less well-to-do. This is even more evident in the next passage:  
 For many kakoi are rich, and agathoi poor; but we will 
not exchange with them arete for wealth’. (Fr. 15)  
   In relation to this strong statement, Donlan observes that  
‘Not only does Solon identify himself with the agathoi 
poor, he places wealth in direct opposition to arete. 
According to the old epic-aristocratic system of values 
wealth was an essential ingredient of arete, but by now 
this latter concept had been modified to the extent that 
wealth could be depicted as an impediment to it’1. 
   Solon was not universally opposed to wealth
2
 though he was very 
much concerned about the role and power of money
3
. He was one of the 
first thinkers who acknowledged the dangerous aspects of it, especially 
in the (then) new form of monetisation. 
‘And as for wealth, there's no limit set clearly down; for 
such as have to-day the greatest riches among us, these 
have twice the eagerness that others have, and who can 
satisfy all?’ (Fr. 13) 
   Money itself (and the desire for it) may be said to be unlimited
4
. 
According to Seaford ‘It was this new unlimit that created the severe 
crisis of indebtedness that he was appointed to resolve’5. Solon himself, 
who was the first to point to the unlimited desire for wealth, also insists 
that there are limits to its power
6. This brings to mind Solon’s interview 
                                                                                                         
we find there the same connection between lust for money, violation of Dike's altar 
and punishment.  
1
 Donlan (1999) at 74. 
2
 See Fr. 13: ‘Wealth I desire, but not to hold it unrighteously, for surely sometime 
retribution comes.’ 
3
 Seaford (2004) at 90: ‘The first unequivocal evidence for money seems to be 
provided by the legislation of Solon’. 
4
 Aristotle, Politics, 1.1256b: “But there is another kind of acquisition that is specially 
called wealth-getting, and that is so called with justice and to this kind it is due that 
there is thought to be no limit to riches and property.”  
5
 Seaford (2004) at 94. 
6
 Fr. 24: ‘Equally rich is he who has abundancy of silver, gold, and acres under 
plough, horses and mules, and he that only has the means to eat well, couch well, and 
go softly shod... This is a man’s true wealth: he cannot take all those possessions with 
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with Croesus, reported by Herodotus (Histories, 1.30) and Plutarch 
(Solon, 27) where moderation is contrasted to hubris, limit to limitless, 
natural order to wealth’s capriciousness. According to Plutarch 
‘Croesus at once judged Solon to be a strange and uncouth 
fellow, since he did not make an abundance of gold and 
silver his measure of happiness, but admired the life and 
death of an ordinary private man more than all this display 
of power and sovereignty’1. 
   Solon was one of the first and most prominent theorists of 
moderation. He was the first who gave practical substance to it in his 
legislation by understanding the value of limits – not surprisingly, he 
connected this idea to wealth. He exercised moderation by denying 
becoming a tyrant
2
 and he put his idea of justice and equality from the 
world of ethics into the practice of legislation by trying to reach a 
compromise between the combating interests of the different classes
3
. 
Solon’s equality is not numerical but proportional, giving to each man 
and class their due according to their merit
4. Yet, Solon’s great 
contribution is that even unequal laws (for example, his division of 
classes according to wealth and his laws providing for unequal 
distribution of political rights and privileges) might be upheld quite 
equally and objectively while accepted and sanctioned by the 
community at large
5
. 
   Another, equally important, contribution of Solon relates to the 
acknowledgment of the capricious reversibility of fortune (as reflected 
on the capricious and unjust distribution of wealth by the gods and 
illustrated in the story of Croesus)
6
. Although this idea is to be found in 
earlier Greek poets, notably Hesiod, what is original in his thought is 
                                                                                                         
him when he goes below. No price he pays can buy escape from death, or grim 
diseases, or the onset of old age’. 
1
 Seaford (2004) at 166: ‘Nor is it a coincidence that our earliest source for Solon, 
apart from his own words, is Herodotus (1.29–33), who also describes him as 
concerned with unlimited wealth –the unlimited wealth of Croesus, which he contrasts 
with the ritualised limit (public death ritual) of the life of an Athenian man named 
‘Tellos’ – suggestive of telos, whose basic sense of limit or completion qualifies it to 
refer to ritual.’ 
2
 Frs. 32 (To Phocus), 33. For the link in tragedy between tyranny and obsession for 
money, see Seaford (2003).   . 
3
 He even compares himself with a boundary-stone (a limit): ‘whereas I, I stood as a 
mark in the midway betwixt the two hosts of them’. 
4
 This traditional understanding of equality for the Greeks provided the basis for a 
more detailed treatment of equality and justice by later philosophers such as Plato and 
Aristotle (e.g. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book V).  
5
Vlastos (1953) at 351: ‘It is instructive that these reforms which go so far in the 
direction of judicial equality should not have been termed Isonomia in either Solon’s 
poems, whose ideal is Eunomia, or any of our later sources’. 
6
 Solon fr. 13 (West): 'Tis sure the Gods give us men possessions, yet a ruin is 
revealed thereout, which one man hath now and another then, whensoever Zeus 
sendeth it in retribution’ and fr. 15: ‘Many bad men are rich, many good men poor; 
but we, we will not exchange virtue for these men's wealth; for the one endureth 
whereas the other belongeth now to this man and now to that’. 
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that ‘he introduces faith in a principle of divine order consisting of the 
continuous change of the targets of ate  and the perennial redistribution 
of riches’1. Having said this, law as a human creation (νόμος, from the 
verb νέμω ‘to distribute’) can become an artificial way of educating 
citizens in (the permanent asset of) virtue (fr. 15) and creating order 
(mirroring the divine order Solon believed in) within an otherwise 
chaotic and unjust world (especially regarding the unpredictable 
distribution of wealth). Unlimited desire for the future unlimited 
accumulation of material wealth causes divine punishment. According 
to Solon’s worldview ‘Equally rich is he who has abundancy of silver, 
gold, and acres under plough, horses and mules, and he that only has the 
means to eat well, couch well, and go softly shod... This is a man’s true 
wealth: he cannot take all those possessions with him when he goes 
below. No price he pays can buy escape from death, or grim diseases, or 
the onset of old age’ [fr. 24 (West)] 
   According to Vlastos ‘[I]n this respect the peasant is the equal of the 
great landowner. For the latter’s surplus cannot be converted into 
immediate satisfaction and can therefore be crossed out of the equation 
of true wealth. And since the increase of wealth may not keep pace with 
an even greater increment of desire, the quotient satisfaction may 
decrease with the accumulation of property and the 
pentakosiomedimnos may be actually ‘poorer’ than the contented thes.’2       
In applying this idea to the Athenian legal system and the Solonian 
reforms, the statement might be rephrased with minor amendments. 
Firstly, although Athenian citizens had not been afforded the same 
political rights and privileges, they should enjoy the same protection by 
and be equal before the law, regardless the quantity of their material 
wealth. This is reflected in the Solonian reforms and, quite surprisingly, 
it was the ambivalent nature of wealth itself that assisted this quest. 
Secondly, the landowners’ surplus ‘should not’ be converted into 
immediate satisfaction as far as the legal system was concerned. The 
administration of justice should be impartial and remain uninfluenced 
by the respective wealth and power of participants. In the same way that 
no one can escape death or disease, all citizens are to receive, 
proportionally, objectively and impartially, what is their due by the law. 
The power of wealth must stay outside the realm of the legal system. 
This human artifice therefore, copies the natural and god-administered 
idea of justice and order and adapts it to the realm of the polis. 
Although the aforementioned ideas are not made explicit in Solon’s 
poetry, they may be extracted from his targeted reforms. Uncovering 
these ideas is the aim of the next section. 
 
 
 
                                            
1
 Noussia-Fantuzzi (2010) at 201. 
2
 Vlastos (1946) at 78. 
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Solon’s Legal Reforms in the light of his approach to Money and 
Wealth 
 
   The third part of this paper examines Solon’s legal reforms in the 
light of his approach to money and wealth discussed in part II. As has 
already been stated, Solon was one of the first thinkers to understand 
the power and the potential influence of money. For him, these signified 
a need for the new-born legal system to control its impending impact; 
yet he couldn’t disregard the reality of emerging, widespread 
monetisation. The following analysis of some indicative and most 
relevant to the issue reforms will illustrate that these provide an 
innovative and purposeful regulation of the role and influence of wealth 
based on three axes:  
i) Wherever appropriate, money should stay outside the legal 
system or, in other words, the law (together with other venerated things) 
should be considered as beyond the realm of money. 
ii) Money should be used for the advantage of the legal system. 
iii) The unlimit of money should be taken seriously; the legal 
system must reset the socio-political boundaries, overcome any 
unnecessary barriers and create appropriate limits. 
   The most famous of Solon’s reforms was the seisactheia (shaking-off 
of burdens). Its meaning is disputed but according to Harris it ‘liberated 
the hektemoroi from the payments of ‘protection money’ they had to 
pay to their lords’1. With this reform Solon liberated the mortgaged land 
and reinstated the ancestral boundaries, thus resetting proper limits 
which reinstated and promoted more suitable and just social and 
political limits. 
          Whereof before the judgement-seat of Time 
The mighty mother of the Olympian gods,  
Black Earth, would best bear witness, for 'twas I 
Removed her many boundary-posts implanted: 
Ere then she was a slave, but now is free. (Solon Fr. 36) 
 
   Richard Seaford in his Money and the Early Greek Mind writes that 
‘The accumulation of money... may destroy the limits that deﬁne social 
relations. The same Solon who complained that people multiply their 
wealth without limit was faced with a crisis consisting of the 
destruction of vital ancient limits on the land: the poor man, unable to 
repay debt, sees his land absorbed into his rich neighbour’s.’2 This 
exact problem, created by the undue power and use of wealth, was 
corrected by Solon. Certain things should be considered beyond the 
realm of money, the ancestral land being one of them. Moreover, the 
setting of appropriate limits squares with Solon’s philosophy and 
ideology as discussed in the previous section. Proper limits and 
                                            
1
 Harris (1997).   
2
 Seaford (2004) at 277. 
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boundaries are signs of moderation and of just, proportionate 
distribution. In a fragment (37.10), Solon even calls himself a 
boundary-stone standing impartially between the opposing sides. This 
reform, which could be visible by Athenians on the now free land of 
Attica, was the depiction and practical expression of Solon’s perception 
of hubris (excess) and moderation. Finally, reaffirming Solon’s 
ideology regarding proper limits, his laws instituted a ceiling to 
maximum property size - regardless of the legality of its acquisition (i.e. 
by marriage) -  meant to prevent excessive accumulation of land by 
powerful families.  
   Related to the seisactheia was the abolition of debts and of debt-
bondage. Rhodes and Leao maintain that this probably referred to ‘an 
abolition of the obligations and of the status of the hektemoroi 
(dependent farmers who cultivated what used to be their own land and 
gave one sixth of produce to their creditors): they had been liable to 
enslavement and loss of their land if they defaulted on their obligations, 
and with the removal of their obligations that liability was removed 
too... It is possible – but we cannot be sure – that he cancelled some 
debts in addition to the obligations of the hektemoroi, and that he 
rescued and liberated some slaves in addition to defaulting 
hektemoroi.’1 From then on, the freedom of an Athenian citizen stood 
above the realm of money: his body could not be used as collateral in a 
monetary transaction and, although he could temporarily find himself in 
debt-bondage (bound to the creditor until his debt was discharged), he 
could not be permanently enslaved for debt (i.e. the creditor does not 
have all the rights exercised by an owner, just the right to his services 
for a certain period of time.).
2
This particular reform facilitated the 
creation of a new, venerated sense of Athenian identity, distinct and 
separate from the sphere of monetary transactions. 
   Solon did not simply liberate the less well-to-do; he gave them 
(limited, proportional but extremely important) political rights. He 
utilised this new authority of wealth in order to break up with the old 
aristocratic order by creating new social classes based not on birth 
anymore but on wealth
3
. In this way he facilitated wider participation of 
the population in the decision-making process (taking part in the 
administration as members of the assembly and as jurors in the new 
Heliaea). Moreover, it instilled a legitimate motivation and ambition for 
success and development in the minds of the lower classes since it 
allowed for social mobility. The participation of the thetes (lower class) 
in the law-court proved to be extremely important, being characterised 
by Aristotle in the Athenaion Politeia (9.1) as one of the three most 
                                            
1
 Rhodes & Leao (2016) at 114.  
2
 Harris (2002). 
3
 Plutarch. Solon 18; Ath. Pol. 7; cf. Rhodes and Leao (2016) at 129: ‘Using wealth as 
the sole criterion of eligibility suggests that there was now in Athens a significant 
body of rich men outside the leading families, who claimed and to whom Solon 
wanted to give a share in political leadership’. 
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democratic measures. Plutarch describes this measure in the following 
words: 
‘This last privilege seemed at first of no moment, but 
afterwards proved to be of the very highest importance, 
since most disputes finally came into the hands of these 
jurors. For even in cases which Solon assigned to the 
magistrates for decision, he allowed also an appeal to a 
popular court when any one desired it. Besides, it is said 
that his laws were obscurely and ambiguously worded on 
purpose to enhance the power of the popular courts. For 
since parties to a controversy could not get satisfaction from 
the laws, the result was that they always wanted jurors to 
decide it, and every dispute was laid before them, so that 
they were in a manner master of the laws.’1 (Plutarch. Solon 
18) 
    According to Aristotle, ‘Solon for his part appears to bestow only the 
minimum of power upon the people, the function of electing the 
magistrates and of calling them to account’ (Politics 1274a). The 
process was that ‘the archons were appointed by lot from men pre-
elected by each of the tribes: for the nine archons each tribe pre-elected 
ten men, and they performed the allotment on these.’ (Athenaion 
Politeia 8.1) Therefore, although the poor did not have the right to hold 
magistracies, this power of electing them promoted necessary checks on 
their power as well as a more inclusive and accountable approach to 
government
2
. A similar purpose (limiting the power of the aristocrat by 
creating checks and balances in the constitution) was served by the 
creation of the Council of Four Hundred (Athenaion Politeia. 8.4, 
Plutarch. Solon 19.1-2) which balanced the power and influence of the 
traditionally aristocratic Council of the Areopagus
3
.  
   This requirement for efficient cooperation of the different classes and 
institutions sought to promote harmony and concord among the citizens. 
A Solonian reform serving this aim was the provision regarding 
prosecution of certain forms of wrongdoing by ho boulomenos 
(whoever wishes). In this way he tried to overcome any barriers 
                                            
1
 According to Thomas (2005) at 42 in the more developed Athenian democracy of the 
5
th
 and 4
th
 centuries: ‘Democrats were content to leave the jury scope for interpretation 
in individual cases, and oligarchs were keener to iron out ambiguities’. This is 
supported by the Ath. Pol. (35.2) which states that ‘The Thirty removed the laws of 
Ephialtes and Archestratos about the Areopagus, and annulled the laws of Solon which 
had ambiguities and abolished the authority of the jurors’. 
2
 Rhodes and Leao (2016) at 129: ‘If Solon wanted to provide an opportunity for rich 
men outside the leading families, election in the first stage would exclude men 
palpably unsuitable while allotment in the second would improve the chances of these 
outsiders’. 
3
 The Areopagus was manned by the ex-archons who would for some time continue to 
be members of the old leading families. The Council of Four Hundred, a separate 
body responsible for preparing the agenda of the assembly, would take away some of 
the powers of this traditional institution. 
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inhibiting justice and to compensate for the weakness of the multitude 
to stand against the powerful members of the elite. As Plutarch 
maintains,  
‘The law-giver in this way rightly accustomed the citizens, 
as members of one body, to feel and sympathize with one 
another's wrongs. And we are told of a saying of his which 
is consonant with this law. Being asked, namely, what city 
was best to live in, ‘That city’ he replied, ‘in which those 
who are not wronged, no less than those who are wronged, 
exert themselves to punish the wrongdoers.’ (Plutarch, 
Solon 18) 
   Solon aimed at using money for the benefit of the polis and its legal 
system. The legal reform that better illustrates this effort is the 
definition of penalties in monetary terms. This does not solely apply to 
Solon. It is precisely the deﬁnition of penalties that was particularly 
remembered in traditions about the other early lawgivers; and the early 
laws known from inscriptions are also concerned to specify penalties. 
Solonian legislation speciﬁed monetary sums as compensation for 
injuries. According to Athenian tradition, Solon repealed the laws of 
Draco, all except those concerning homicide, because they were too 
severe and their penalties too heavy. For one penalty was assigned to 
almost all transgressions, namely death, so that even those convicted of 
idleness were put to death, and those who stole salad or fruit received 
the same punishment as those who committed sacrilege or murder. 
Solon by defining the penalties in monetary terms, introduced the 
notion of justice as proportionality and elevated public agreement to the 
status of the legitimising force behind these new provisions
1
. In 
addition, the monetary definition of compensation promoted legal 
certainty and precision (against the old ad hoc and potentially arbitrary 
approach to sentencing), depersonalisation of disputes and dispute-
settlement, and uniformity. As Seaford describes
2
, ‘the judicial 
enforcement of equivalence between offence and monetary 
compensation implies the equivalence also of the hostile parties. As 
Aristotle will make explicit, it does not matter whether a base person 
has offended against a decent one or vice-versa: ‘the law looks only at 
the harm inﬂicted, and treats the people involved as equals’ (EN 
1132a5). 
   Finally, Solon was very much concerned with regulating economic 
matters in the polis and checking the influence of wealth in its obvious 
and subtle manifestations. Solon’s reforms empowered the polis as an 
institution to supersede the power of the individual oikoi. Plutarch 
(Solon 20) describes a law concerning the regulation of dowries by the 
polis, thus dealing with marriage, an institution very much related to 
                                            
1
 Seaford (2004) at 195: ‘Public agreement on the amount of compensation for injuries 
is a vital means of ensuring peaceful order in the polis by preventing the perpetuation 
of conﬂict.’ 
2
 Seaford (2004) at 195. 
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intra-familial and inter-oikos matters. The law provided for ‘the 
prohibition of dowries; the bride was to bring with her three changes of 
raiment, household stuff of small value, and nothing else. For he did not 
wish that marriage should be a matter of profit or price, but that man 
and wife should dwell together for the delights of love and the getting 
of children.’1. In accordance with our interpretative model, marriage 
and the establishment of a family are institutions to be regulated by the 
polis standing above and beyond the sphere of money. A similar effort 
to regulate intra-oikos economic matters is evident in the law 
concerning wills. Solon conceded to the owner the legal ability to 
dispose of his possessions. Other examples include the regulation and 
restriction of funeral expenditures directed against the prerogatives of 
certain groups (especially the aristocrats) whose economic power and 
social influence Solon wanted to control by limiting their luxurious 
manifestations of mourning
2
, the precise monetary assessment of 
offerings, sacrifices
3
 and prizes for athletic victories
4
. Wherever 
possible and appropriate, the influence of wealth should stay outside the 
legal sphere as certain things and objects are venerated. Otherwise, 
acknowledging the new reality of widespread monetisation, money 
should be used for the benefit of the polis.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
   In the reforms of Solon we find traces of the ideology of the 
developed Athenian legal system of the classical period. According to 
this interpretation, amateurism (or, the complete absence of 
professionalism) in the courts of classical Athens, is not to be attributed 
solely to egalitarianism and the pursuit of strict democracy but also to 
this polis’ approach towards wealth. In order to control the influence of 
money, the Athenians (following the spirit and the practice of their 
great lawgiver) made a conscious decision not to allow expertise to 
escalate the always present inequalities that exist within a legal system. 
Perfect equality before the law can only be achieved in an ideal world; 
yet the Athenians strived for it, sometimes by following unusual paths, 
with the ideas of Solon being their guide. 
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